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“In the Asia-Pacific region whe問 welive, political and social conditions are generally 
stable, despite some ongoing disputes and conflicts. Economically, the region continue 
to enjoy dynamic growth, tummg to its advantage us characteristically rich diversity and 
high level of openness. . tins ASla-Pacific region may indeed be acqmring a E問 at
potential to contribute pohncally and economically to the peace and prosperity of the 
world.”＇＂ Wuh these叩enmgremarks Prime Minister M1yazawa began hIS optimistic 
tow d’horizon in Bangkok on January 16th 1993 Miyazawa was eager both to salute 
'the“ASEANway’”of constructive diplomatic dialogue and to draw attention to hIS own 
nation’S commitment to further regionahsm. Prime Minister Miyazawa stated that, given 
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the disappomting co『1ditionof the world economy，‘i is essential that the economy of the 
Asia Pacific region, in particular that of the ASEAN countries, continue its dynamic 
development’山 Itwas not to be. By August 1997 the region found itself in a m句or
economic and financial cnsis that would begin in Thailand and engulf each and every 
state in the region山
P目sentedwith what is stil in the autumn of 1999 an ongomg series of domestic and 
external challenges to the Asia-Pacific region, the historian has two duties. He must first 
describe and then explain how the crash severely dented a thousand policy statements 
and left the region uncertain as to its future goals. Given the scale of the political, 
economic and human damage caused by recent events it would be surprising indeed if the 
region’s self-confidence had not been shaken. 
It was outsiders, as might well have been anticipated, who found 1t easier to pomt the 
finger at the sins of the region that we日 painfullyexhibited in the two y回目 following
the imtial thunder in Bangkok. It was, claims economist Paul Krugman, an 
unprecedented crisis.“Never in the course of economic events not even in the early 
years of the Depression has so large a part of the world economy experienced so 
devastating a fal from grace.”Even m October 1999 when Asian governments we問
boasting that the region was well on the road to recovery, the first deputy managing 
director of the IMF warned of the prospect of further disruptions unless substantial 
financial and corporate reform was carried out nnmediately. 山 Thefear that‘the 
strengthening recovery will reduce the urgency of reform, and allow a business-as-usual 
attitude to set in, is very real', cautioned the IMF at the World Economic Forum’s 
meeting m Singapnre.＇剣
The details of the・ 1997 Asian financial crisis are clearer than the doubts over where 
responsibility for the debacle lies The immediate difficulties started in Thailand on 
the eve incidentally of the問ーoccupationof Hong Kong by the People’s Republic of 
China - before spreading m the form that the world’s media aptly termed “Asian 
Jopon, A,io, ond the Crn'h o The Reg;o' ond Reo1;1;., 75 
contagion”It app回目thatintemattonal investors began to make massive withdrawals of 
funds from Southeast Asia m the wake of currency日uctuations.山 Theease and 
inexpense of capttal mobility guaranteed that once the region’s economies were felt to be 
vulnerable then international fund manage目 wouldwithdraw their highly liquid assets 
The Mcleod & Gamaut collection of essays provides a most helpful examination of what 
wentwroog and what lessons might be learned from the rapid and large scale disaster."' 
The financial mishaps are stressed to the extent that 'the shock of 1997’is described as‘a 
defining event io the economic history of East Asia’山 Itconcludes that‘Ltke the Great 
Depression in the West, it has the capacity to change thought about economic 
development and economic policy io fundamental ways’同i
Whether the 1997 cnsts has substanti叫lyaltered the region's policy behaviour is far 
from clear. In the winter of 1999 it is doubtful if Japan, for example, has accepted either 
its share of respoostbility for what weot wrong in the Asia Pacific zone or yet altered its 
long-standing admimstrative and political practices. Japan gives litle evidence of much 
shifl in its thinking and contioues to hope against hope that both the recovery of the 
region and its own long-delayed economic rehabilitation will occur wtthout pain or cost 
to the stability of the state and its own society "'" 
The suggestion that Tokyo was involved io the begioning of the crisis and has done 
relatively litle to assist m the solutions to the region’s problems needs to be underlined. 
The view that it was merely the lapses of a small number of financial institutions that has 
held back Japan is implicit in Aktyosht Horiuchi’s chapter in East Asia in Crisis.＂＇』
While a necessary part of the whole picture, it has nothing to say on the disappointing 
state of the wider Japanese economy in the 1990s Others, fortunately, have been less 
reticent. Marcus Noland in his address to the Keidanren in September 1999 saw 
Japanese institutions as being partly to blame for the extraordinary inflows and outflows 
of funds from southeast Asia in the late 1980s and mid 1990s. It was not only Western 
speculators that invested and quにklydisinvested as the bubble b ult up and then burst."" 
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The question of where contemporary Japan stands in its dealings with the Asia-Pacific 
region remains somewhat unclear, particularly as al nations have had to concentrate their 
ene弔問son recovering, as best they can, from the downturns of the late 1990s山 The
topic though is obviously of m吋orscholarly mterest. All the works under review a陀
obliged to consider this issue. The more ambitious student would attempt a synthesis 
that could boldly mco中orateinternational田lations,and current history with the newer 
discipline of political economy but that will only be possible after the more specialized 
monographs have been assimilated. 
Pleas for clarity m this (and other) contexts are almost by definition un-Japanese 
Indeed, as Drifte argues, there may be excellent political motives for such deliberate 
obfuscation "" Yet the almost unanimous acceptance that Japan’s economic and 
日nancialstrengths are the key to its foreign policies can not be hidden Japan is either a 
m旬oreconomic power or it is nothmg How itdeals with maintaining and expanding 
such a pos1t1on in the Asia-Pacific region exercises al our authors 
There is general agreement among them that the recent Asian crisis is unlikely to alter 
the somewhat narrow focus of Japanese international relations山 Moreover,it is 
suggested that the current crisis has greatly impaired the foreign policy debate on 
‘Whither Japan？’ and further delayed the long hoped for precision and clarity that must 
eventually be realized 1f Tokyo JS senous about its claims to global influence. The 1990s 
have seen relatively litle change in the mtemational status of Japan; indeed, it is possible 
that Japan has regr田sedthrough narrowmg its focus to long-standing but stil only partly 
solved domestic issues. 
The d1f自cultiesthat observe四 expenencein attempting to reach definite conclusions 
are bluntly seen in Drifte’s subtitle ‘From Economic Superpower to What Power？’－ 
and the somewhat amo中housconclusions that he reaches州 Othershave encountered 
similar problems The hopes expressed earlier in the 1990s on Japan’S willingness to 
coope国民onvital global issues of secunty, poverty and the environment are no longer 
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pres回tlynear the top of the agenda."" We are left with a sense of disappomtment at 
Japan’S irresolution. 
The vtew that Japan’s primary interest is economic and that It will at best alter its 
behaviours only slowly is a frequent comment in the literature 山 Theclaim that Japan is 
a‘regional supe中ower'(Drifte) and that its economic dominance in the ASta-Pacific 
regton is such that, m Hatch and Yamaura’s subtitle to their study, there is‘a regional 
production alliance’in the process of being born"'" ch町acterizescommentary at least up 
to the eve of the 1997 crisis. Since then the relative failure of Japan to asist the region, 
primanly by improving its own economy and thereby enabling its neighbours to export 
mo日 toJapan, has問ducedthe at四ctivenessof any Japan田emodel to othe問。山
Suggestions on Japan’s international ambitions a問 mostunlikely to reemerge until the 
economy improves and the financial posttton is clearer What is apparent at the turn of 
the century is the uncertainty of both economic and secunty related issues for Japan and 
the wider region. The economic and financial difficulties of the 1990s ensure, at the ve『y
least, that the“Pacific Century" rhetoric and the implicit assumption of Japanese 
leadership in such economic and (perhaps) cultu四lareas is now open to question. It is 
no longer possible for autho四 toboldly begin their essays on Asian regional security by 
stating unequivocably that the ‘Asia Pacific enjoys a peace and prosperity that is the 
envy of the rest of the world' "" Such optimism was always dubious and ts now 
dangerous All states and entities in the region a肥 havingpresently to rethink their 
positions in the light of their own particular failings, both economic and often political，凸
as well as the weaknesses of attempts at regionalism. 
Most commentators appear to hold the view that the present balance of power 
structure, dependent on the United States and premised by essentially Cold War thinking, 
ought to be modified by the addition of cooperative, open structures that would 
encourage wider discussion and greater transparency among al parties in the region. The 
frequency with which such suggesttons are made with regard to virtually each and every 
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relationship is not, however, necessarily reassuring山 Itmay simply be a substitute for 
more detailed and mo日 difficultthought, it is highly improbable that constant reference 
to‘confidence building’can solve such myriad issues山 Gettingthe USA, Japan, the 
PRC and the Russian Federation to form multilateral bodies may take decades of work. 
In a competitive and unstable regional environment it would appear unlikely that 
Japan 1s about to shift its basic strategy. The anxieties shared by its neighbours and 
portions of the Japanese public on any far－悶achingmove to alter its long-established 
security policies would seem to be unfounded "" 
The severe economic disruptions of the 1990s have reinforced the prevalent 
minimalism within the nation’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. Its 
options for the arly 21st century are likely to be restricted by economic realities at home 
that will work agamst a more activist approach to Asia and the wider world. For the 
present it might be wise to echo the remarks of the日rstpostwar British ambassador to 
Tokyo. When preparing his annual目viewon Japan in 1954, Sir Esler Dening adopted a 
suitably sceptical posture in the face of the unknown. He wrote to the Foreign Office that 
Japan‘was in the process of moving from defeat and occupation to the attainment of her 
new position in the world-whatever that may prove to be' 
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